Statistics don’t count for anything,” declared Will Willoughby, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s former head of reliability and safety during the Apollo moon landing program. “They have no place in engineering anywhere.” Now director of reliability management and quality assurance for the U.S. Navy, Washington, D.C., he still holds that risk is minimized not by statistical test programs, but by “attention taken in design, where it belongs.” His design-­oriented view prevailed in NASA in the 1970s, when the space shuttle was designed and built by many of the engineers who had worked on the Apollo program. Pincus, Walter (March 5, 1986). "NASA's Push to Put Citizen in Space Overtook Fully 'Operational' Shuttle". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Archived from the original on August 2, 2017 . Retrieved July 14, 2020.

Spaceship Free 3D Models download - Free3D Spaceship Free 3D Models download - Free3D

Another competing approach was maintaining the Saturn V production line and using its large payload capacity to launch a space station in a few payloads rather than many smaller shuttle payloads. A related concept was servicing the space station using the Air Force Titan III-M to launch a larger Gemini capsule, called " Big Gemini", or a smaller "glider" version of the shuttle with no main engines and a 15ft ×30ft (4.6m ×9.1m) payload bay.a b c d Heppenheimer, T. A. (1998). The Space Shuttle Decision. NASA. Archived from the original on November 7, 2019 . Retrieved July 12, 2017. Causes: inadequate original design (booster joint rotated farther open than intended); faulty judgment (managers decided to launch despite record low temperatures and ice on launch pad); possible unanticipated external events (severe wind shear may have been a contributing factor). I added the wheels for a purely demonstrational purpose, not intending for them to be able to support the weight of the model.

Challenger Disaster: A Case of Subjective Engineering The Challenger Disaster: A Case of Subjective Engineering

By the early 1980s many figures were being quoted for the overall risk to the shuttle, with estimates of a catastrophic failure ranging from less than 1 chance in 100 to 1 chance in 100 000. “The higher figures [1 in 100] come from working engineers, and the very low figures [1 in 100 000] from management,” wrote physicist Richard P. Feynman in his appendix “Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle” to the 1986 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. I made a 1:78 scale model of the NASA Space Shuttle completely out of recycled materials using tools that are common and can be found in an average house. I mainly used cardboard and Elmer's glue. NASA’s “management methodology” for collection of data and determination of risk was laid out in NASA’s 1985 safety analysis for Galileo. The Johnson space center authors explained: “Early in the program it was decided not to use reliability (or probability) numbers in the design of the Shuttle” because the magnitude of testing required to statistically verify the numerical predictions “is not considered practical.” Furthermore, they noted, “experience has shown that with the safety, reliability, and quality assurance requirements imposed on manned space­flight contractors, standard failure rate data are pessimistic.” Despite the potential benefits for the Air Force, the military was satisfied with its expendable boosters and did not need or want the shuttle as much as NASA did. Because the space agency needed outside support, the Defense Department (DoD) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) gained primary control over the design process. For example, NASA planned a 40-by-12-foot (12.2 by 3.7m) cargo bay, but NRO specified a 60-by-15-foot (18.3 by 4.6m) bay because it expected future intelligence satellites to become larger. When Faget again proposed a 12ft (3.7m) wide payload bay, the military almost immediately insisted on retaining the 15ft (4.6m) width. The Air Force also gained the equivalent of the use of one of the shuttles for free despite not paying for the shuttle's development or construction. In exchange for the NASA concessions, the Air Force testified to the Senate Space Committee on the shuttle's behalf in March 1971. [4] :216,232–234 [5]Grumman Aerospace Corporation; The Boeing Company (March 15, 1972). Space Shuttle System Program Definition - Phase B Extension - Final Report (PDF) (Technical report). NASA. hdl: 2060/19740022195. NASA-CR-134338. Archived (PDF) from the original on April 5, 2023. Grey estimated that spares of the crucial modules might add another 10 percent to the space station’s cost. “But NASA is not willing to go to bat for that extra because they ’re unwilling to take the political risk,” he said— a replay, he fears, of NASA’s response to the political negativism over the shuttle in the 1970s.

Space Modeling HobbySpace - Space Modeling

Also to examine the shuttle as a system, NASA conducted a one-time critical functions assessment in 1978, which searched for multiple and cascading failures. The information from all these studies fed one way into an overall mission safety assessment. A failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) was the heart of NASA’s effort to ensure reliability, the NRC report noted. An FMEA, carried out by the contractor building each shuttle element or subsystem, was performed on all flight hardware and on ground support equipment that interfaced with flight hard ware. Its chief purpose was to i dentify hardware critical to the performance and safety of the mission. Lessons learned: in design, to use probabilistic risk assessment more in evaluating and assigning priorities to risks; in operation, to establish certain launch commit criteria that cannot be waived by anyone. As for actually making the wheels, I cut out a template of a diameter of 2cm and using that drew around 36 of them (9 for each wheel). Lytle, P. J. (August 15, 1981). "Current Status of the HAL/S Compiler on the Modcomp Classic 7870 Computer". In Renzetti, N. A. (ed.). The Telecommunications and Data Acquisition Progress Report 42-64 (PDF) (Technical report). JPL, NASA. p.232. hdl: 2060/19810022557. NASA-CR-164695. Archived (PDF) from the original on August 1, 2023 . Retrieved August 1, 2023.NASA documents show that the airline vision also applied to risk. For example, in the 1969 NASA Space Shuttle Task Group Report, the authors wrote: “It is desirable that the vehicle configuration provide for crew/passenger safety in a manner and to the degree as provided in present day commercial jet aircraft.” In 1969, United States Vice President Spiro Agnew chaired the National Aeronautics and Space Council, which discussed post- Apollo options for human space activities. [1] The recommendations of the Council would heavily influence the decisions of the administration. The Council considered four major options: