As the 9/11 Commission’s final report told the story: “An FBI agent detailed to the Bin Ladin unit at CIA attempted to share this information with colleagues at FBI headquarters. Curt Weldon's assertion that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers was picked up by the national media in August 2005, after it was reported in the bimonthly Government Security News.

But even if the FBI had received no help from any other agency, we’ve uncovered compelling evidence that the agents of Squad I-49 (the bin Laden Squad in the FBI’s New York Office) should have tripped to the presence of the two hijackers in the U. Because you may have done some things that I don’t particularly agree with, or that frankly might have been deadly or in violation of the law [but that] doesn’t mean that I’m going to treat you any different. After his capture following the Embassy bombings in 1998, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-’Owali, the Saudi who drove the truck, gave FBI agents the number of a safe house in Sana’a Yemen maintained by Sameer Mohammed Ahmed al-Hada, the brother-in-law of Khalid al-Midhar. By January 4th, a CIA operative made an extraordinary mistake that ignited one of the great interagency disputes on the road to 9/11. However, this occurred because the inspector at the Miami District Office who changed Atta's admission date failed to follow the proper procedure to ensure that the previous entry would be corrected, and a new entry was created in NIIS.That looks to me as if it may be obstruction of the committee's activities", Specter, R-Pennsylvania, said at the start of his committee's hearing into the unit. The information was omitted primarily because they found it to be suspect despite having been briefed on it two times by two different military officers on active duty.

Known as “spook central,” Fort Belvoir housed the Information Dominance Center—a building full of army intelligence “geeks,” whose bullpen area was designed to look like the bridge of the Starship Enterprise from Star Trek. Naturally, in assessing the JTTF’s “next to perfect record,” White avoided certain details, such as how the JTTF’s boss, Carson Dunbar, had thwarted the FBI’s best chance of stopping the first attack on the Twin Towers by alienating Emad Salem and failing to authorize the surveillance he pleaded for on two of Ali Mohamed’s trained cell members Abouhalima and Salameh.Mohamed has made some kind of deal with the government,” Ruhnke believes, “that will surely have him out of prison on some date certain that he knows about.