They hustled down the corridor to show it to the then prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. “This is very serious, isn’t it?” she said. But it was too late: they’d been taken by surprise, and an invasion occurred two days later. He writes that “making ourselves more resilient” in the face of threats posed by conspiracy-laden arguments online, a failure to defend scientific reasoning and an unwillingness to apply evidence properly to policymaking was “the call to arms that animated” him to write the book in the first place. The GCHQ outpost at Bude, Cornwall (Photo: Kieran Doherty/Reuters) Propaganda from Russia Omand learnt from this, and any number of other moments – including his grouchy confrontation with Bosnian-Serb warlord Ratko Mladic, and a host of crisply told Cold War tales of defectors, double agents and spycatchers – that you need to think systematically and strategically to avoid errors and surprises like that seminal Falklands moment.

Apparently, this in relation to Richard III at the battle of Bosworth. It’s hardly surprising that a spy would be strong on attention to detail and how noticing little things that can tell you a lot! We know that one misjudged comment at the national safety day from the CEO can undermine years of hard work and that critical incidents are key. When push comes to shove, the canteen will say “and they did / didn’t do; said / didn’t say X did they?!” in one of two entirely different ways … both of which will have a huge impact on the culture and hence behaviours – and hence the risk levels. The first part is gaining a fuller understanding as you are able to of what is happening. The second part is a deep understanding as to why it is happening and the various motivations behind any parties involved. From that, you need to assess different scenarios of what might happen if events unfold in particular ways. The final element is the assessment of any issues that might affect the item under consideration, including events that might be considered as outliers at the moment. I'm going to start with a petty annoyance about the book. The book is not about how "spies" think, it's about how "analysts" think, in particular intelligence analysts. I suspect the publisher thinks that being a spy is sexier than being an analyst, so using "spies" makes sense from a marketing perspective. But there is a big difference in the two analytical perspectives. He believes the British government “has begun to wake up”. But why then have we not had the kind of official investigation undertaken in the US by Robert Mueller? “It may be political sensitivities over Brexit,” he says. “We’ve been rather slow, I think, and I’m still not quite clear who in government is really responsible for protecting the nation from disinformation.” Inside GCHQ (Photo: Jacob King/PA) One big regret Across five decades, intelligence, its uses and pervasion in public society have been shaped and altered by a wide array of world events and technological advances. With ten chapters, David delivers almost a dozen important lessons that anyone, not just analysts, can apply in today’s context. These range from critical thinking skills to varying up your approach when it comes to greater problem solving and considering every item of evidence available to you. Bullet-pointed summaries at the end of each chapter allow the reader to easily take in these insights.

During our phone interview from his London home, Sir David is diplomatically scathing about the British approach thus far. Memorandum from Commander General Vogel to the Marine Corps Regarding Enlistment of "Navaho" Indians (1942)

Final observation: while this book is entitled ‘How Spies Think’– it really isn’t. The title is frankly misleading. It’s really how the suits – Whitehall analysts, managers and those charged with assessing intelligence – might, could or should, think (but usually don’t). A decent read. The meat of the content is contained in the first 4 chapters, where the author expresses their explanatory 'SEES' model. There are some nice anecdotes from Sir David's long career and his references to intelligence methods (E.g. Heuer tables, Bayesian thinking (although the content on the latter is overwrought)) are insightful. My main issue is towards the end, where I think he cops-out from the logical conclusion of his analysis. As a securocrat, it makes sense for him to primarily be occupied with the downsides of the digitalisation of our lives.Tim Marsh takes a look at the David Omand book and applies some of its findings to health and safety.

Explanations must be transparent to how sensitive they are to assumptions and if they were different whether they would change your explanation

FREE -A DIGITAL VERSION OF 'EMPEROR'

And there was the visit to Belgrade to deliver an ultimatum to Ratko Mladić, commander of the Bosnian Serb Army. Sir David’s delegation had been forewarned he “was likely to be bluffly affable” so resolved to rebuff his offer of sweetmeats and plum brandy. It worked as “an act that we guessed would cause offence and thus jolt Mladić into recognising this was not a friendly visit”. Brexit negotiations You may also opt to downgrade to Standard Digital, a robust journalistic offering that fulfils many user’s needs. Compare Standard and Premium Digital here. Each lesson is grounded in case studies such as the UK’s flawed anticipation of the Falklands invasion in 1982. These build to more contemporary examples such as Russian disinformation campaigns in the US and French general elections. With this grounding in place, Omand goes on to explain mistakes made and why they matter to the bigger picture. The real meat and potatoes of the book is Chapter 10; here the author embarks on a deeper dive into modern subversive tactics on the internet. The problems he describes should matter to all of us in the west; this section spins the most comprehensive web of intrigue. We always tend to believe that people working in intelligent department use different ways of thinking actually not. It is just an extension of critical thinking and moreover they listen to their enemy or event information with utmost care. Omand’s opening yarn is about the moment in early 1982 when he and his then boss, the defence minister, were handed an urgent GCHQ dossier informing them that the Argentine fleet was on course for the Falklands.

We are more swayed by our emotions, perhaps, than previous generations. And that is a direct effect of absorbing so much material on the internet. It has got worse in the digital age,” he says.From the former director of GCHQ, Professor Sir David Omand, learn the methodology used by British intelligence agencies to reach judgements, establish the right level of confidence and act decisively. Full of revealing examples from a storied career, including key briefings with Prime Ministers and strategies used in conflicts from the Cold War to the present, in How Spies Think Professor Omand arms us with the tools to sort fact from fiction, and shows us how to use real intelligence every day. Read more Look Inside Details In short, in the data gathering espionage, world, as in safety, it would appear that you get what you deserve – not what you wish for. He sketches a predictive portrait of 2027 first as a dystopia of democratic dysfunction, and then another one in which the West has preserved the value of the internet while curbing its damaging tendencies; with a few tentative prescriptions to set us on the latter course. If you do nothing, you will be auto-enrolled in our premium digital monthly subscription plan and retain complete access for 65 € per month. Last week, a group of MPs and peers filed legal proceedings against the Government for failing to protect UK democracy from Russian interference. Sir David tells i he cannot be confident British voters “have not been swayed by propaganda of one kind or another emanating from Russia”.