The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law) (Clarendon Law Series)

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The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law) (Clarendon Law Series)

The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law) (Clarendon Law Series)

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Its themes include the nebulous nature of law, reasons behind force and compliance, as well as the development and coercion of morality. Hart, who died in 1992, remains an impactful figure in several fields, including law, psychology, sociology, and religious studies where author Karen Armstrong considers him hugely influential. The descriptive nature of Hart’s concept of legal obligation does not make it inadequate instead, it aids Hart’s analysis. Due to its descriptive nature, Hart’s account takes care of the controversy present in the positivism: those who are subject to a legal system have an obligation to obey unjust laws [21]. They may still have a legal obligation to obey that law, however, they do not have to. By separating law and morality, Hart makes it possible for an individual to recognise a morally objectionable rule and to not obey that rule, a feature that was not present in previous accounts provided by positivists such as Austin. As Hart stated, if a rule is so morally wrong, individuals in a community do not have to obey the rule [22]. situations, but in terms of a likelihood of sanctions in case of disobedience, making an obligation a

The external point of view [8]: the point of view of an observer where rules are seen as a regular pattern of conforming behaviour. Abbott, Kenneth W.; Keohane, Robert O.; Moravcsik, Andrew; Slaughter, Anne-Marie; Snidal, Duncan (2000). "The Concept of Legalization" (PDF). International Organization. 54 (3): 401–419. doi: 10.1162/002081800551271. ISSN 1531-5088. S2CID 16285815. Archived from the original on 2005-01-20. This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.For the most part, the rule of recognition is not stated, but it existence is shown in the way in which A distinction between primary and secondary legal rules, where a primary rule governs conduct and a secondary rule allows the creation, alteration, or extinction of primary rules. Lacey, Nicola (2006). A Life of H.L.A. Hart. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.222. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199202775.003.0010. ISBN 9780199202775.

Hart draws a distinction between a social habit (which people follow habitually but where breaking the habit does not bring about opprobrium - going to the cinema on Thursday for example) and a social rule (where breaking the rule is seen as wrong - neglecting to take off one's hat upon entering a church, for example). We feel in some sense bound by social rules and laws frequently appear to be types of social rule. The Concept of Law is a nonfiction book by legal philosopher and Oxford University professor H. L. A. Hart. The central concept of the book is the examination of legal philosophy within the context of analytical jurisprudence. The other philosophical area that Hart explores is linguistic analysis, which is the definitions of specific legal terms and expressions, and their interpretation depending on context. In fact, linguistic analysis is a method that Hart employs in writing the book. This is because the theory and practice of law are dependent on the interpretation of legal terms, expressions, rulings, and opinions of judges. For this reason, Hart emphasizes the importance of defining terms and how they could be interpreted by lawyers and legal scholars. ii) Persistence of laws long after the sovereign and those who rendered him habitual obedience haveHart married Jenifer Fischer Williams, a civil servant, later a senior civil servant, in the Home Office and, still later, Oxford historian at St Anne's College (specialising in the history of the police). [10] Jenifer Hart was, for some years in the mid-1930s and fading out totally by decade's end, a 'sleeper' member of the Communist Party of Great Britain. Three decades later she was interviewed by Peter Wright as having been in a position to have passed information to the Soviets, and to Wright, MI5's official spy hunter, she explained her situation; Wright took no action. In fact her work as civil servant was in fields such as family policy and so would have been of no interest to the Soviets. [11] The person who recruited her, Bernard Floud, interviewed by Wright shortly after, maintained that he was unable to remember ever having done so. Nor was her husband in a position to convey to her information of use, despite vague newspaper suggestions, given the sharp separation of his work from that of foreign affairs and its focus on German spies and British turncoats rather than on matters related to the Soviet ally. In fact, Hart was anticommunist.

Hart did not return to his legal practice after the war, preferring instead to accept the offer of a teaching fellowship (in philosophy, not law) at New College, Oxford. Hart cites J. L. Austin as particularly influential during this time. [6] The two jointly taught from 1948 a seminar on 'Legal and Moral Responsibility'. Among Hart's publications at this time were the essays 'A Logician's Fairytale', 'Is There Knowledge by Acquaintance?', 'Law and Fact' and 'The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights'. The Concept of Law (1961) by English legal philosopher Herbert Lionel Adolphus (H.L.A.) Hart revisits foundational philosophical tracts regarding law to analyze, reject, or expand their theories of law and social control. He ultimately concludes that the idea of law is a social construction with no direct tie to an equal, fair, and prosperous society. After graduating from Oxford, Hart worked for MI5 (Britain’s FBI) for several years, before becoming Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford. (Jurisprudence is the study of law). Several historians and theorists consider The Concept of Law to be the most important work on jurisprudence of the 20 th century. noteworthy that rules can also exist without obligating anyone e. rules of etiquette or speech are notThe primary rules bind people whether they like or not, wish or not; secondary rules bestow facilities upon them for realizing their wishes. the master rule; The Rule of Recognition. Hart says that the ROR is a simple or a complex instrument

done before as well that being under an obligation and being obliged are inherently two different things. most closely to matters of criminal law and even then it fails to recognize the fact that a criminal Hart stresses that what is necessary is an internal point of view and stemming from that, what he callsfunction is to identify whether another rule is part of the legal system or not. Wherever such a rule of In 1952, Hart was elected Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford and was a fellow at University College, Oxford, from 1952 to 1973. [8] It was in the summer of that year that he began writing his most famous book, The Concept of Law, though it was not published until 1961. In the interim, he published another major work, Causation in the Law (with Tony Honoré) (1959). He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1959 to 1960. He gave the 1962 Master-Mind Lecture. [9] One of the problems in Hart’s concept of legal obligation, according to Ronal Dworkin [14], is its descriptive nature, as it is morally neutral and has not justificatory aim. Dworkin could not comprehend how Hart justified the imposition of a legal obligation by using the concepts primary and secondary rules, and rules conceived from an internal and external aspect of law. In Dworkin’s opinion [15], Hart failed to explain the normative nature of a conventional rule, which for Dworkin was, the existence of a justification, of some good moral grounds to explain why individuals were acting according to what rules required. According to him rules could not exist in a factual state of affair. Hart’s social practice theory fails to justify why individuals are under an obligation, such as judges being under an obligation to follow social rules. For Dworkin [16], individuals follow a standard regular pattern of behaviour because diverging from that pattern can offend others. Social rules alone cannot impose an obligation, as it arises because of the moral basis that an individual has to respect the social rule. If a court uses an unstated rule of recognition, to identify particular rules of the system then that is a



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