The 33rd Guards Rifle Corps was part of the 5th Guards Army, which was transferred from the control of the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 8 July ( Glantz & House 2004, p.323). Of the army's two corps, only this one was present on the battlefield of Prokhorovka ( Glantz & House 2004, p.167). The other corps – the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps – was deployed further west, in the battlefield near Oboyan ( Clark 2012, p.230). Zetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2000). Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis. Cass Series on the Soviet (Russian) Study of War. London: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-7146-5052-8. A defining characteristic of most battles is confusion, with even commanders uncertain of the progress of their forces. This was particularly true of Prokhorovka, where a clash between two great tank armies took place in a confined space close to a rail junction and the River Psel – one which few tank commanders would have chosen – and with the fighting enveloped in clouds of dust.

Battle of Prokhorovka - Wikipedia

Bergström, Christer (2007). Kursk– The Air Battle: July 1943. Hersham, UK: Chevron/Ian Allan. ISBN 978-1-903223-88-8. Bauman, Walter (1998). Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise – Phase II (KOSAVE II) (Report). Bethesda, MD: US Army Concepts Analysis Agency. Archived from the original on 20 June 2013. – A study of the southern sector of the Battle of Kursk conducted by the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (under the US Army's Center for Strategy and Force Evaluation) and directed by Walter J. Bauman, using data collected from military archives in Germany and Russia by The Dupuy Institute (TDI). Maps of the Battle of Prokhorovka, July 1943". Archived from the original on 5 January 2014 . Retrieved 17 July 2015. Zamulin, Valeriy (2012). "Prokhorovka: The Origins and Evolution of a Myth". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 25 (4): 582–595. doi: 10.1080/13518046.2012.730391. S2CID 144132258.A rare aerial colour photo of German armour moving into action on the first morning of the Battle of Kursk. Clark, Lloyd (2012). Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern Front 1943. London: Headline Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-7553-3639-5. Any chance that the German forces could have built on, and acquired momentum from, their tactical victory in the tank battle was thus lost. Von Manstein protested vigorously and pressed for a modified version of Citadel, ‘Operation Roland’, which would take advantage of the heavy Soviet armoured losses. But in vain. The USSR went on to inflict a major defeat on Germany during the Moscow counter-offensive during the winter of 1941–1942, closing the door on the Germans ending the war on the terms Hitler set out. The later Battle of Stalingrad in 1942–1943 ended the possibility of German victory completely. By day's end on 11 July Leibstandarte had advanced deep into the Soviet third defensive belt. [63] They had moved up the Psel corridor, cleared Soviet resistance at the Oktyabrsky ("October") State Farm (Russian: Совхоз Октябрьский), crossed a 15-foot (4.6m)-deep anti-tank ditch at the base of Hill 252.2 and seized the hill itself after a brief but bloody battle, [64] leaving them only 3 kilometres (1.9mi) south of Prokhorovka. [63] To its northwest, the panzergrenadiers of Totenkopf had achieved a bridgehead across the Psel and tanks had been brought across, but they had yet to take Hill 226.6 and there was a 5-kilometre (3.1mi) gap between Totenkopf and Leibstandarte. To the south of Leibstandarte, Das Reich had also met stiff resistance and lagged behind some 4 kilometres (2.5mi). [62] With its advance, Leibstandarte‍ was exposed on both of its flanks. [64]

Book sends tale of Soviet tank victory up in smoke

He therefore claimed that, although the number of tanks that had been destroyed was indeed great, it was more than made up for by the fact that the Germans had lost 400 tanks, including 70 Tigers.

Today the Russian state declares that there are three sacred battlefields in its Motherland where 'victory' changed the course of the nation's history: Wave after wave of T-34s, the greater part of the Soviet 25th Tanks Corps, now came down the hill, forming, in Ribbentrop’s words, ‘an unimaginable mass of armour approaching at top speed.’ All seemed lost for the panzer companies below. The foundation of the myth of Prokhorovka was the need of the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant-General Pavel Rotmistrov, to explain the heavy losses suffered by the army under his command to Stalin, who was not well-known for a tolerant attitude to bad news.