Wasp IX (CV-18)". Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. Navy Department, Naval History and Heritage Command . Retrieved March 17, 2021. This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sourcesin this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.

Smith, Robert Ross (2000) [1960]. "Chapter 21: Luzon Versus Formosa". Command Decisions. United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 70-7. Archived from the original on 30 December 2007 . Retrieved 8 December 2007. Leyte Gulf: The Pacific War's Greatest Battle". Naval History Magazine. Vol.23, no.5. U.S. Naval Institute. October 2009 . Retrieved August 24, 2020. Regarding Halsey's failure to turn TF34 southwards when Seventh Fleet's first calls for assistance off Samar were received, Morison writes: Hoyt, Edwin P. (2003). The Men of the Gambier Bay: The Amazing True Story of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Lyons Press. ISBN 1-58574-643-6. FM-2 Wildcat fighters 1 TBF, 11 TBM Avenger torpedo bombers Carrier Division 26 (Rear Adm. Ralph A. Ofstie)Toll, Ian W. (2020). Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944–1945. New York: W. W. Norton.

Hornfischer, James D. (February 2004). The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's Finest Hour. Bantam. ISBN 0-553-80257-7. Nevertheless, at 16:22, in a desperate and even more belated attempt to intervene in the events off Samar, Halsey formed a new task group—TG34.5—under Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger II, [79] built around Third Fleet's two fastest battleships— Iowa and New Jersey, both capable of a speed of more than 32kn (59km/h; 37mph)—and TF34's three cruisers and eight destroyers, and sped southwards, leaving Lee and the other four battleships to follow. As Morison observes, if Badger's group had succeeded in intercepting the Japanese Center Force it may have been outgunned by Kurita's battleships. [80] A surface action group is "a temporary or standing organization of combatant ships, other than carriers, tailored for a specific tactical mission". [26] Underway replenishment [ edit ] Carrier battle groups will add muscle to Navy power". Archived from the original on 25 October 2012. The fact that Halsey was aboard one of the two fast battleships ( New Jersey), and "would have had to remain behind" with TF34 while the bulk of his fleet charged northwards, may have influenced his decision, but it would have been perfectly feasible to have taken one or both of Third Fleet's two fastest battleships with some or all of the large carriers in the pursuit of Ozawa, while leaving the rest of the battle line off the San Bernardino Strait. Halsey's original plan for TF34 was for four, not all six, of Third Fleet's battleships.

Nachi (10 × 8-in. main battery) Ashigara (10 × 8-in. main battery) Destroyer Squadron 1 (Rear Adm. Masatomi Kimura) Senior officers in Seventh Fleet (including Kinkaid and his staff) generally assumed Halsey was taking his three available carrier groups northwards (McCain's group, the strongest in Third Fleet, was still returning from the direction of Ulithi), but leaving the battleships of TF34 covering the San Bernardino Strait against the Japanese Center Force. In fact, Halsey had not yet formed TF34, and all six of Willis Lee's battleships were on their way northwards with the carriers, as well as every available cruiser and destroyer of Third Fleet. FM-2 Wildcat fighters 11 TBM Avenger torpedo bombers Screen 3 Fletcher-class destroyers (5 × 5-in. main battery)

Unfortunately, Halsey sent this second message by voice radio, so Seventh Fleet did not intercept it (due to the range limitations of the ship-to-ship voice radio networks in use at the time) and Halsey did not follow up with a telegraphic message to Nimitz or King, or vitally, Kinkaid. The serious misunderstanding caused by Halsey's imperfect wording of his first message and his failure to notify Nimitz, King, or Kinkaid of his second clarifying message had a profound influence on the subsequent course of the battle as Kurita's major force almost overwhelmed Kinkaid's unprepared lighter force on the doorstep of the Leyte landings. [47] [45] Halsey's decision (24 October 1944) [ edit ] The Indian Navy's carrier battle group centered on Viraat consisted of two destroyers, usually of the Delhi class (previously Rajputs were used), two or more frigates, usually of the Brahmaputra, Godavari or Nilgiri classes, and one support ship. [10] India [ edit ] A flotilla from the Indian Navy's Western Fleet escorts the aircraft carriers INS Viraat and INS Vikramaditya through the Arabian Sea in 2014. At 02:40 on 25 October, Halsey detached TF34, built around Third Fleet's six battleships and commanded by Vice Admiral Lee. As dawn approached, the ships of Task Force 34 drew ahead of the carrier groups. Halsey intended Mitscher to make air strikes followed by the heavy gunfire of Lee's battleships. [73] Coleman, Kent S., LCDR, USN (June 16, 2006). Halsey at Leyte Gulf: Command Decision and Disunity of Effort (PDF) ( M.M.A.S. thesis). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. p.iii. Archived (PDF) from the original on June 9, 2018 – via Defense Technical Information Center. {{ cite thesis}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( link) Alt URL

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Tully, Anthony P. (2009). Battle of Surigao Strait. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-35242-2. The Battle That Won the Pacific". Popular Mechanics. Vol.83, no.2. Hearst Magazines. February 1945. pp.17–25, 150. ISSN 0032-4558. Vice Admiral Shōji Nishimura (killed during battle) in battleship Yamashiro Force C (sortied from Brunei Bay 22 Oct) Vice Adm. Nishimura (KIA)