The U.S. minister to China, Paul Reinsch, warned that if Japan were not contained, it would become ‘the greatest engine of military oppression and dominance’ that the world had ever seen and that a ‘huge armed conflict’ would be ‘absolutely inevitable.’” Dogged original research and superb narrative skills come together in this gripping account of pitiless evil. A deeply researched and exceptionally readable book about a period with which many Americans are, in practice, only cursorily familiar. Kagan offers a wealth of detail, nuance, and complexity, bringing this critical period in America’s rise to global leadership vividly to life."

It is hard to read about this aspect of World War I without thinking of the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine. The United States and its European allies, to be sure, have not sent their own troops to the battlefield, but their supply of weapons and other assistance to the Ukrainians has been critical to the latter’s success. And while President Biden and other Western leaders have indeed presented the conflict as a struggle between democracy and autocracy, what seems most to have moved public opinion in the democracies was the exposure of Russian war crimes and atrocities in Bucha and other cities. Vladimir Putin’s goal of terrorizing Ukrainians seems to have led him to discount the damage that this policy has inflicted on his own country’s global standing, and to neglect its impact in stiffening the spine of Western publics. Here is a comprehensive, sweeping history of America’s rise to global superpower—a follow-up to the author’s acclaimed first volume, from our nation’s earliest days to the dawn of the twentieth century. First, you need to make sure Egor shows up at the party. Travel to The Complex at Noon and disable his device. Then, head to Updaam in the Evening with Shift (Airborne and Reach), Nexus (Influence), and a silenced weapon. Keep to the left side of the map and clear a path for your return. You will most likely need to avoid Julianna after the party.As (Walter) Lippman put it, "Having disarmed ourselves and divided the old Allies from each other, we adopted the pious resolutions of the Kellogg Pact, and refused even to participate in the organization of a World Court. At the dawn of the 20th century, the United States was a nation unsure about the role it wanted to play in the world, if any. Robert Kagan, New York Times best-selling author and one of the country’s most influential strategic thinkers, provides a comprehensive and historical account of America’s rise to global superpower. While many Americans preferred to avoid being drawn into what seemed an ever more competitive, conflictual, and militarized international environment, many also were eager to see the United States take a share of international responsibility and work with others to preserve peace and advance civilization. The story of American foreign policy in the first four decades of the 20th century is about the effort to do both — “to adjust the nation to its new position without sacrificing the principles developed in the past,” as one contemporary put it. The Lusitania, a British cruise liner sailing from New York to Liverpool, was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine, resulting in the deaths of almost 1,200 men, women, and children, including over 120 Americans. This incident provoked public outrage, but the outrage was not sufficient to overcome American resistance to being drawn into war. It would take almost two full years before Wilson (a careful monitor of popular sentiment) and the American people overcame their reluctance to become engaged in the conflict. There is some irony in Kagan’s account of how America reluctantly embraced the role as global superpower, but was unwilling to recognize the fact that it created the very conditions through its absence, that necessitated its emergence. The moral exceptionalism with which the United States held (and continued to hold) itself, and its skepticism at the time about European intentions and imperial politics, saw the country keen to remain safe behind two oceans. Had, as Kagan argues, Washington engaged slightly more, provided some indication of its interests in European disputes, or exercised a fraction of its latent power, history could well have been dramatically different.

Marc F. Plattner is a contributing editor of American Purpose , the founding co-editor emeritus of the Journal of Democracy and a distinguished nonresident fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) International Forum for Democratic Studies. Kagan has produced a formidable work of synthesis and analysis based on prodigious reading and deep thinking. He adroitly places the evolution of U.S. policy in the context of developments in Europe and Asia, illuminating the challenges emanating from external events without losing sight of the domestic political context. His provocative conclusions will force scholars and students, policy makers and lay readers to reassess their understanding of America’s role in the international arena from the Spanish-American War to World War II.” The United States of the early 20th century was indeed developing into an economic colossus but without the desire to play a large role in international affairs. The country, and its leaders, expressed a high level of disdain and distrust for such affairs, and were very reluctant to get intertwined in the rivalries and great power maneuvering of Europe. Kagan takes us through this period, leading up to the U.S. entry into World War I, with great detail. We get a real view of public opinion, and the political currents running through this question in the U.S. That opinion, right up until the U.S. entry into the War, always had a sizable segment favoring no involvement. The book is worth reading just for the detailed description of the tortured road Woodrow Wilson took from neutrality to American entry into WW I, and how some key public opinion changed over the course of the first three years of the war. Was there something more at stake than anger over German actions? A comprehensive, sweeping history of America's rise to global superpower--a follow up to the author's acclaimed first volume, from our nation's earliest days to the dawn of the twentieth century. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the United States was one of the world’s richest, most populous, and most technologically advanced nations. It was also a nation divided along numerous fault lines, with conflicting aspirations and concerns pulling it in different directions. America’s resulting intervention in World War II marked the beginning of a new era for the United States and for the world.A deeply researched and exceptionally readable book about a period with which many Americans are, in practice, only cursorily familiar.Kagan offers a wealth of detail, nuance, and complexity, bringing this critical period in America’s rise to global leadership vividly to life.” Liberal democracy’s continuing predominance is far from assured. It faces challenges from powerful autocratic rivals. But I think it is a mistake to conclude that history is inevitably on the side of despotism rather than of freedom. It has long been apparent that liberal democracy has some serious weaknesses, but it also has great underlying strengths. Yes, for the foreseeable future the fortunes of liberal democracy will depend on American power, but that power itself derives from America’s liberal foundations.

Americans on the scene-career diplomats, military officers, and political appointees alike-warned throughout the 1920s that the danger of another war was high, that American economic interests were threatened, and that absent a more active American diplomacy a ‘catastrophe’ loomed.” A professional historian’s product through and through, sharply focused on its period and supported by amazingly detailed endnotes....Probably the most comprehensive, and most impressive, recent analysis we have of how Americans regarded the outside world and its own place in it during those four critical decades....Mr. Kagan recounts presidential decision-making and official actions in great detail, yet offers even greater analysis of the swirls of U.S. public opinion, the arguments of the press and pundits, the evidence in Gallup polls, and the ever-important actions of senators and congressmen." Kagan's book...offers an intelligent, knowledgeable, and surprisingly balanced view of the immense contradictions that fueled America’s rise....Kagan’s treatment of the ’30s is astute." Now drop down one level, entering the single door that leads to Aleksis and the Meat Grinder. You can either hang around until Aleksis makes his speech, dropping him in the Meat Grinder. Or simply one shot him again with Aether on like we did with Egor and Wenjie. Stay out of line of slight with the Ethernalists and you'll remain undetected. The book provides context and perspective about both America's internal dialogue and then entrance to World War I; what America did or did not do during the 1920's and 1930's as war approached. During this time the "America First" movement (originated approximately before WW1) - and revived itself before WW2. Much detail linking Great Britain's "appeasement" at Munich before WW2 - to Great Britain's (correct) assessment that the United States would not support them in a shooting war with Germany; and further that at that time Great Britain could not prevail in a shooting war with Germany.Critics have suggested that Kagan’s view is far narrower than it perhaps should be, and that it should have included more of the parochial European and imperial interests than it does. This is an unfair criticism as Kagan’s latest is, of course, a history of American foreign relations and, more importantly, how America viewed its power and purpose at the beginning of the 20th century. Here, Kagan masterfully captures not just the high politics of Washington, but also the political machines around successive presidents, the press eco-system, and the public sentiment. This holistic view is vital to understanding America at this time, and what shaped and constrained the actions of successive presidencies. This is a particularly interesting point as the presidency at the turn of the 20th century was far more constrained by activist Congresses in exercising power than today’s contemporaries would recognize (or indeed welcome). Walter Lippmann spelled out these broader interests in the New Republic in the weeks following Germany’s January 30 announcement. He argued that the United States had an interest not in legalisms about neutral rights but in the preservation of an ‘Atlantic Community’ made up of the western and mostly democratic nations on both sides of the ocean. It had an interest in seeing to it that ‘the world’s highway’ should not be closed either to Americans or the Western Allies. It had an interest in defending ‘the civilization of which we are a part’ against the ‘anarchy’ that would result from a German victory. Germany was fighting for ‘a victory subversive of the world system in which America lives.’” It was the party of Theodore Roosevelt who had asked Americans to ‘take a risk for internationalism.’ But in the process of opposing Wilson and the League, Lodge and his colleagues had radically shifted. The Republican Party became the party it would be for the next quarter century, the party that equated internationalism with Bolshevism, the party of ‘Americanism’ and insular nationalism, the party of rigid abstention from world politics, the party of William Borah. Republicans treated the League as if it were a European plot for world domination. They depicted France and Great Britain not as loyal allies who deserved American support but as greedy imperialists trying to bully and ensnare the United States in their wily scheme.”