These ‘hyper-globalists’ have lost touch with the electorate they purport to represent and cater to. The values from unfashionable non-urban regions are undesirable and excluded in the voice of institutions such as academia, media, creative cultural institutions. Virtues of certain groups are upheld as desirable, honourable and rewarded with high status while others are slammed as ignorant ‘Karens and Gammons.’ I worry that things are not going to get better any time soon as there is still no real dialog just hot air.

Values, Voice and Virtue - Google Books

Carrying on from National Populism, Goodwin brings his argument right up to date, painting a clear picture of the “left behind” working class’s justifiable feeling of abandonment and resentment. It clearly explains the collapsing Red Wall and just as clearly explains the impending collapse of those newly-blue seats in the next election.Funder reveals how O’Shaughnessy Blair self-effacingly supported Orwell intellectually, emotionally, medically and financially ... why didn’t Orwell do the same for his wife in her equally serious time of need?’ This point ought not to be lost. Although the progressives are certain of their correctness, they have failed to persuade many of their fellow citizens. This closes the democratic avenue to change because few people would vote for their agenda. Instead, the progressives rely on increasingly autocratic means. The DRS in Scotland, the brainchild of the governing Green Party, is a case in point. Other disproportionate harms are reflected in statistics on suicide, family breakdown, depression and the abuse of drink and drugs. Cast aside by a new elite that promotes “alternate families” they are increasingly seeing single parent households. The elites meanwhile maintain secure family units, favouring marriage and similarly minded spouses. I have never fully understood what Brexit was about, i.e., why it caught the attention of British voters when it did, why it was such a polarizing issue in 2016 when ten years earlier it had not been forefront in the minds of British voters, and what the British national dialogue has really been talking about when they say they are talking about Brexit. I have thought about MAGA in the same context, i.e., why did it happen when it did? What does it say about the United States that Trump was able to capture some component of the American population that he probably would have not been able to do a decade earlier? Party politics this isn’t, his argument is that the two leading political parties in the UK are virtually indistinguishable in their service of a new elite and have failed to serve the values, voice and virtues of the British electorate. As such he follows in the footsteps of commentators such David Goodhart, John Gray and Eric Kaufmann.

This obsession with a ‘new elite’ hides the real roots of

The national, public funded broadcaster the BBC is experiencing record levels of distrust. At a time when Britain could be said to be one of the most tolerant countries in the most tolerant era of western history (discrimination by most metrics is at an all time low) a manic agenda is being pushed on the public. 60% live in fear of contravening the latest speech codes and see “political correctness” as undermining their free speech. Too often, Goodwin uses anecdotes as evidence of wider trends. Douglas Murray can sometimes be guilty of this too. They make a massive claim then support it by a single example from a particular newspaper columnist or politician. As it happens, I think the claims they make when using these examples are broadly right, but it isn't going to persuade somebody who isn't already on their side. You may change or cancel your subscription or trial at any time online. Simply log into Settings & Account and select "Cancel" on the right-hand side. A very readable and interesting assessment of the changing relationship between our politicians, the changing nature of political orthodoxy and how we are being governed. If you have any interest in politics, miss this book at your peril. Ok so I started writing a llllllooonnnnnngggggg review here and realised that those who ought to read this book would not be swayed - after all I am not too far removed from the demographic that they have been ignoring or demonising for over three decades now.

The analysis was clear, underpinned by sufficient statistics to support the analysis. Further forward looking projections would have enhanced my enjoyment.

Values, Voice and Virtue - Penguin Books UK

The fundamental thrust of Goodwin's argument is right ... a new centre ground of British politics is being formed - even if both parties have yet to fully comprehend it' The TimesWhat has caused the recent seismic changes in British politics, including Brexit and a series of populist revolts against the elite? I found this analysis of the breakdown in traditional voting patterns both fascinating and comforting. Fascinating in that it brought into focus the conditions which can give rise to populist political figures and comforting in that it shed light on my feelings of political dismay about political discourse and my changing relationship to politics and how we are governed. Where might the real centre ground of British politics lie? “We love our NHS, hang the paedos” — that was a tongue-in-cheek formula sketched out in 2018 by Jeremy Driver, a tweeter who might just be the most influential political philosopher you’ve never heard of. His viral tweet came at the height of the excitement about a new centrist party, but little did Driver know that Boris Johnson would soon seize his mantra as the ideological path to power. I now face the dilemma of realising just how illiberal and truely unrepresentative the left has become in this "brave new world" while hating the right (I'm looking at you Maggie and Ronald) for bringing us here in the first damn place. It doesn't take a genius to work out that all of these three elements, particularly the first two, were present among British elites for most of the twentieth century. The one element of the 'new elite' that I think does distinguish them from earlier elites is their 'liberal cosmopolitanism' - but the crass distinction between new/old elites means that Goodwin never really focuses on the question of WHY elites are increasingly inclined to those views. He makes a start by pointing out the massive rise in the number of people attending university, but universities are themselves becoming ever more 'liberal'.I found the points made in the book clearly explained. There is very little recourse to jargon. The author deploys research to support his points as necessary, without over-burdening the reader with endless footnotes. I liked that approach. Either Goodwin doesn't understand that the groups he talks about overlap, or he doesn't want to dig into the nuance. He talks about the working class as if it is only made up of white and straight people. There's no recognition that many people of colour/LGBT+ people are also working class.

The New Elite is in complete denial - spiked

If the political right wishes to win a large share of votes from these people, it needs to emphasise issues relating to immigration and the culture wars - rather than make the mistake of Trussonomics in thinking that we can return to Thatcherism. While the author recognises that some of Mrs Thatcher's reforms were good and necessary, the key fault of Thatcherism is that it prioritises the market over the country, which, in turn, creates the conditions for greater globalization and feeds the demand for mass immigration. Figures such as Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson were able to appeal to this constituency by emphasising issues such as national sovereignty, limiting immigration, and levelling-up parts of the country outside of London.An excellent book for understanding the current state of play in British politics. Matthew Goodwin argues that the economic liberalism of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government combined with the cultural liberalism of Tony Blair's New Labour regime has created a political culture in the United Kingdom that is now just as polarised as that of America or continental Europe. The divide is now mainly between the university-educated, socially liberal, and pro-mass immigration elite on the one hand and the culturally conservative national populists on the other. The latter group tend to be more right-wing on cultural issues, but more left-wing on economics.