Zhao Ziyang seen supporting Tiananmen protests, supporting thesis that popular discontent only poses a real threat if used for intra-elite conflict In een uitgebreide inleiding geeft de auteur toelichting over hoe hij toegang kreeg tot Chinese archieven die normaal gezien ontoegankelijk zijn voor buitenlanders. Hierbij heeft hij de toon voor de rest van zijn relaas gelegd. China probeert internationaal aan te tonen dat ze sinds 1976 in een ‘Golden Age’ zitten. Hiermee beweren ze dat hun economie jaarlijks een grote groei maakt. Er zijn zelfs jaren waarin ze 10% groei zouden hebben gehad. Dit beeld werd wereldwijd aanvaard zonder het een keer goed onder de loep te nemen en dit is nu wat Frank Dikötter met dit boek probeert te doen. Hij zal het beeld dat we hebben van China, als grote economische reus in twijfel trekken. Hij zal nog een stapje verder gaan, door aan te tonen dat het land, ondanks zijn vele hervormingen eigenlijk nog niet veel verder staat dan veertig jaar geleden. Bovendien heeft China nog steeds vele schulden, overproductie in de fabrieken die staatseigendom zijn, het platteland wordt nog steeds verwaarloosd, etc… . Het lijkt wel alsof het land maar niet leert uit zijn voorgaande fouten. But if upon completing chapter 8 readers get the idea that in the coming years the Chinese economy and political system face collapse after teetering on the brink of irremediable crisis, they are in for a rude awakening. A close reading of chapter 9 and the first section of chapter 10 prompts us to study the relevant comparisons worldwide. For example, we might want to study the early signs of a possible degradation of some of the core institutions of United States democracy and that country’s declining economic vitality (accelerating indebtedness, for example to China).

China After Mao: The Rise of a Superpower | Hoover

From the Samuel Johnson Prize-winning author of Mao's Great Famine, a timely and compelling account of China in the wake of Chairman MaoWhile one needs to appreciate the ingenuity of the party leadership to develop very innovative policy measures from time to time to handle the contradictions of a ‘socialist market economy,’ one wonders about the sustainability of the Chinese governance model. With the economic modernisation project more than four decades old, the scope for ‘ad-hocism’ in policymaking is increasingly getting constricted.

China After Mao: The Rise of a Superpower: Frank Dikötter

Frank Dikötter, in his research for this history of the People’s Republic since Mao Zedong’s death, benefited from an unprecedented opening-up of party archives from 1996 on, which lasted until Xi Jinping’s accession to power a decade ago. It’s an ironic detail, given that China After Mao covers the period marked by Deng Xiaoping’s vaunted “reform and opening up” that would ultimately change China irrevocably. Dikotter’s latest work is highly recommended for those who want to make sense of the intriguing developments and develop an informed understanding of China’s political and economic evolution in the post-Mao era. Dikotter has done a commendable job of unearthing some archival and other relevant primary sources (including party and other official documents in Mandarin) to uncover some of the most critical periods. While many of China’s western supporters believed that growing prosperity would bring growing demands for political freedom and participation, Xi believes that the separation of powers, judicial autonomy and freedom of speech represent a mortal threat to the party, and that once China’s people are materially better off, they will agree with the party’s claim that China’s socialism is superior to western capitalism. As the early reformer Zhao Ziyang – later disgraced for his opposition to the Tiananmen massacre – put it: “We are setting up special economic zones, not political zones. We must uphold socialism and resist capitalism.”China’s pivot to exports and its accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 were the catalyst for the economic boom but, in Dikötter’s telling, the development has often been illusory, fuelled largely by investment, with China’s growth targets being dutifully met, often thanks to creative accounting.